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HEAT EXPANDS ALL THINGS: THE PROLIFERATION
OF GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE
0BAMA ADMINISTRATION
JONATHAN H. ADLER*

During his campaign for the White House, Barack Obama
called for decisive action to address the threat of global climate
change. Specifically, then-Senator Obama called for reducing,
by 2050, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions in the United States
by 80% through the imposition of a "cap-and-trade" regime. 1
He pledged that, as President, legislation to achieve this goal
would be among his top priorities. 2
Congressional leaders also endorsed decisive action on climate change. In 2009, the House of Representatives enacted a
far-reaching climate bill that included a cap-and-trade system
and endorsed the 80% reduction goaP The Senate refused to
follow suit, however, and it appears unlikely that a cap-andtrade bill or other meaningful climate legislation will pass
Congress in the next two years. 4 But the death of cap-and-trade
does not mean the death of greenhouse gas regulation.

*Professor of Law and Director, Center for Business Law & Regulation, Case
Western Reserve University School of Law. Thanks to Daniel Smith for his research assistance.
1. See The Office of the President-Elect, Agenda: Energy & Environment, CHANGE.GOV,
http://change.gov/agenda/energy_and_environment_agenda/ Qast visited Mar. 19,
2011); see also Barack Obama, U.S. Sen., Remarks at Portsmouth, New Hampshire: Real
Leadership for a Clean Energy Future (Oct. 8, 2007), http://www.barackobama.com/
2007/10/08/remarks_of_senator_barack_obam_28.php.
2. See John M. Broder, Obama Affirms Climate Change Goals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
19, 2008, http://www .nytimes.com/2008/11/19/us/politics/19climate.html.
3. The American Clean Energy and Security Act sought to reduce GHG emissions by 3% below 2005 levels by 2012, 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, and 83%
below 2005 levels by 2050. H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). It is unlikely that this
level of reductions would have been achieved. See infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
4. See Darrell Samuelsohn & Coral Davenport, Democrats Pull Plug on Climate Bz1l,
POUTICO Guly 22, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0710/
40109.html.
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Although Congress did not put climate change legislation on
President Obama' s desk, the Obama Administration still
moved ahead with various regulatory measures to control
GHG emissions. 5 Using authority under the Clean Air Act and
other existing environmental statutes, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other agencies have been expanding
existing regulatory programs to cover GHG emissions and address climate change concerns. 6 Several measures are already in
place and others are in the regulatory pipeline, although citizen
suit litigation could produce still more.
These initiatives will produce a dramatic expansion of federal environmental controls on private economic activity.
Taken together, these controls could represent the largest expansion of federal environmental regulation in decades, and
yet they have never been explicitly endorsed, let alone authorized, by Congress. Worse still, there is little reason to believe
that these measures will do much to reduce the threats posed
by global climate change. Extensive GHG regulation will not
notably mitigate projected warming.
Federal regulation of GHGs is not entirely the Obama Administration's doing. Federal regulatory authority over GHGs
was facilitated-if not mandated-by the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA? Yet the Obama Administration
has not resisted this newfound authority. To the contrary, the
EPA and other agencies have embraced their opportunity to
extend regulatory authority into new fields and have rejected
legislative proposals to cabin their newfound power.
The extension of federal regulatory authority to control GHG
emissions w1.der existing stah1tory frameworks is a mistake.
Such regulation will impose substantial regulatory costs for
minimal environmental gain. Centralized regulatory authority
offers little hope of controlling the planetary thermostat. Instead, mitigating the threat of anthropogenic climate change
requires a different approach-one that is not authorized under

5. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S. CLIMATE ACTION REPORT 2010, at 39 (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/car5/index.htm ("Since assuming office,
President Obama has moved quickly to establish new federal policies and measures
designed to reassert American leadership in solving the global climate challenge.").
6. See infra Part III.
7. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
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existing law and that does not require dramatic expansions of
the federal regulatory state.
Part I of this Article explains how the push for GHG regulation is not new. An environmentalist petition filed in 1999
eventually led to the Supreme Court decision authorizing federal regulation of GHGs under the Clean Air Act. Part II outlines the Obama Administration's use of this authority. The
Clean Air Act, however, is not the only source of federal regulatory authority over GHGs. Part III provides an overview of
some of the other regulatory initiatives undertaken by the
Obarna Administration to limit GHG emissions, or otherwise
address the threat of global climate change.
The expansion of federal regulation does not guarantee an
increase in environmental protection. In the case of GHGs, expansive regulatory action is unlikely to reduce the threat of
climate change. Rather, as Part IV explains, such efforts are
likely to be futile in the near to medium term. If policymakers
wish to reduce the threat of climate change, they need to chart
an alternative course. Part V explains why the best approach to
climate change mitigation should focus on technological innovation and diffusion so as to make significant GHG emission
reductions possible and affordable.
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MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA AND TilE
ROAD TO EPA REGULATION

Extensive scientific research suggests human activity is having a demonstrable effect on the global climate system. 8 Anthropogenic emissions have increased the concentration of
carbon dioxide and other GHGs in the atmosphere, which has
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8. See William Collins et a!., The Physical Science Behind Climate Change, SCI.
AM., Aug. 2007, at 68 (noting that the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report concluded that it was "very likely" that human activity
was responsible for most of late twentieth century warming, whereas the 2001
IPCC report concluded that human responsibility was only "likely"); see also
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE
PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 665 (2007) ("Greenhouse gas forcing has very likely
caused most of the observed global warming over the last 50 years."); NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, ADVANCING THE SCIENCE OF CLIMATE CHANGE 27 (2010)
("Climate change is occurring, is caused largely by human activities, and poses
significant risks for-and in many cases is already affecting-a broad range of
human and natural systems.").
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contributed to a gradual warming of the climate. 9 The precise
nature and degree of the human contribution is unknown, and
may even be unknowable given the complexity of the global
climate system.1° Nonetheless, even so-called "skeptics" accept
that anthropogenic emissions contribute to global warming,
though they dispute the magnitude of the threat.l 1
The road to federal regulation of GHGs under the Clean Air
Act began in 1999, when a handful of environmentalist organizations petitioned the EPA to control GHG emissions from new
motor vehicles under Section 202 of the Act. 12 EPA General
Counsel Jonathan Cannon had recently told a congressional
committee that he believed the Agency had the authority to
regulate GHG emissions but had no intent to do so at that time. 13
The petition aimed to force the EPA's hand. According to the
environmentalist groups, global warming threatened human
health and welfare, obligating the Agency to act.l 4

9. See Collins et al., supra note 8, at 65 ("Over the past 20 years, evidence that humans are affecting the climate has accumulated inexorably, and with it has come
ever greater certainty across the scientific community in the reality of recent climate
change and the potential for much greater change in the future.").
10. This uncertainty need not preclude action to mitigate the threat of climate
change. The case for taking action to address rising atmospheric concentrations
of greenhouse gases need not be premised upon apocalyptic climate projections.
See, e.g., ROGER PIELKE, JR., THE CLIMATE FIX: WHAT SCIENTISTS AND
POLITICIANS WON'T TELL YOU ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING 128-29 (2010); Jonathan H. Adler, Taking ProperhJ Rights Seriously: The Case of Climate Change, 26
Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y 296, 307-09 (2009).
11. See PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., CLIMATE OF EXTREMES:
GLOBAL WARMING SCIENCE THEY DON'T WANT YOU TO KNOW 11-20 (2009); see
also PATRICK J. MICHAELS & ROBERT C. BALLING, JR., THE SATANIC GASES:
CLEARING THE AIR ABOUT GLOBAL WARMING (2000); ROY W. SPENCER, CLIMATE
CONFUSION: HOW GLOBAL WARMING HYSTERIA LEADS TO BAD SCIENCE,
PANDERING POLITICIANS AND MISGUIDED POLICIES THAT HURT THE POOR 6
(2008); John R. Christy, The Global Warming Fiasco, in GLOBAL WARMING AND
OTHER ECO-MYTHS: HOW THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT USES FALSE SCIENCE
TO SCARE US TO DEATH (Ronald Bailey ed., 2002).
12. See Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,922-23 (Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Control of Emissions].
The GHGs specifically at issue are: carbon dioxide (C02), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (ND), and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) Id. at 52,923.
13. Memorandum from Jonathan Z. Cannon, Gen. Counsel, EPA, to Carol M.
Browner, Adm'r, EPA 2 (Apr. 10, 1998), http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/
2007/05/21/cannon-memorandum.pdf.
14. Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52, 923.
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The petition remained unanswered until 2003.15 Neither the
Clinton nor Bush Administrations was eager to unleash the
power of the Clean Air Act on GHGs. Tired of waiting, the
environmentalist petitioners and several northeastern states
threatened to sue the Agency for its failure to act. In September
2003, the EPA denied the petition, declaring that it lacked
statutory authority to regulate GHGs as pollutants under the
Act, and that even if it had such authority, it would decline to
exercise it because there were more effective ways of addressing the threat posed by global warming. 16 The EPA reasoned
that the Act was written to address conventional air pollutants
such as particulates and ozone smog, and not globally dispersed emissions such as carbon dioxide. 17 The Agency further
concluded that coordinated international efforts made more
sense than haphazard regulation built on an Act written for a
different purpose.1s
The environmentalist and state petitioners were neither convinced by the EPA's analysis nor content to wait for congressional action on global warming. Instead, they filed suit, joined
by a large number of states and interest groups. 19 A three-judge
panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit split
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15. The EPA requested public comment on the petition in January 2001, see
Control of Emissions from New and In-use Highway Vehicles and Engines, 66
Fed. Reg. 7486 (Jan. 23, 2001), but it did not respond to the petition until September 2003. See Control of Emissions, supra note 12.
16. See Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52,925.
17. Id. at 52,926-27.
18. ld. at 52,927.
19. The state petitioners were California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. Other government parties were the District of Columbia, American
Samoa, New York City, and Baltimore. The environmentalist petitioners were the
Center for Biological Diversity, Center for Food Safety, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Advocates, Environmental Defense, Friends of the Earth,
Greenpeace, International Center for Technology Assessment, National Environmental Trust, Natural Resources Defense Council, Sierra Club, Union of Concerned
Scientists, and U.S. Public Interest Research Group. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 505 nn.2-4 (2007). Various businesses supported the state and environmentalist petitioners, including the Aspen Skiing Corporation, Calpine, and Entergy, as
did some trade associations and groups representing renewable energy interests. See
generally Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the Global Wanning
Battle, 26 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 208 (2002) (discussing business support for GHG
emission control policies).
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three ways, ultimately rejecting the petitioners' claims, teeing
the case up for the Supreme Court. 20
Massachusetts v. EPA, decided in 2007, is arguably the most
consequential Supreme Court decision of the past five years.
Among other things, the Court held, five to four, that the EPA
had authority to regulate GHGs as air pollutants under the
Clean Air Act and that the Bush Administration had failed to
provide an adequate explanation for its refusal to regulate. 21 The
Court concluded that there was no ambiguity in the Act of the
sort that could trigger Chevron deference and that "greenhouse
gases fit well within the Clean Air Act's capacious definition of
'air pollutant."' 22 Writing for the majority, Justice John Paul Stevens explained that the Act's "broad language" was designed to
ensure sufficient "flexibility" so as to ensure that the Clean Air
Act would not become obsolete. 23 He further brushed aside concems that the Act's complex regulatory structure was a poor fit
for global climate control, even though it had been designed and
refined to combat localized air pollution problems. 24
Assuming that carbon dioxide and other GHGs constituted
air pollutants subject to regulation under ,the Act, the Bush
Administration's refusal to regulate was arbitrary and unmoored from its statutory obligations. In denying the environmentalist and state petition, the EPA did not deny the reality of
human contributions to global climate change, nor did it minimize the threat. To the contrary, the EPA endorsed President
Bush's remarks that the United States "must address" the
threat of climate change and noted other policy initiatives intended to "reduce the risk" of global warming? 5 The EPA simply pursued a "different policy approach" that was a better fit
for the nature of the problem. 21; Trying to use the Clean Air Act
to regulate global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other GHGs did not "make sense," according to the
20. Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 53,58 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
21. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528, 534-35 (2007).
22. Id. at 532.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 532-33.
25. Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52,929-31. The majority in Massachusetts v. EPA took note of the EPA's concessions and "attach[ed] considerable
significance" to Agency statements that global warming is a problem that must
be addressed. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U.S. at 526.
26. Control of Emissions, supra note 12, at 52,929-31.
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Agency, and would have constituted "an inefficient, piecemeal
approach" to the problem. 27 A better approach, according to
the EPA, would be to pursue international agreements so as to
ensure global cooperation on a global concern.
The EPA was likely correct as a policy matter. 28 The United
States is not capable of reducing, let alone controlling, atmospheric concentrations of GHGs on its own, under the Clean
Air Act or otherwise. The global atmosphere is a global commons, and it can only be protected through concerted global
action. Yet the relevant statutory language did not permit the
EPA to consider broader policy concerns or engage in a roving inquiry about whether it is desirable to adopt regulatory
controls on GHGs. It had to exercise its discretion within the
Act's stah1tory limits. 29
Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA is required to regulate motor vehicle emissions of any "air pollutant" that in the "judgment" of the Administrator "cause, or contribute to, air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health
or welfare." 30 Therefore, if GHGs are "air pollutants," the only
question left for the EPA is whether their emissions contribute to
public endangerment.31 Although the Court did not order the
EPA to issue an endangerment finding, that result was a fait ac27. Id. at 52,931.
28. See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 40
ENVTL. L. 1261, 1323 (2010) ("TI1e CAA is not a tool designed to deal with GHG
emissions, or more specifically C02."); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Climate

Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of Greenhouse
Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 2 (2008); Arnold
W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?,
36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 16 (2009).
29. Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U.S. at 533 ("[T]he use of the word 'judgment'
is not a roving license to ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise
discretion within defined statutory limits.").
30. See 42 U.S. C.§ 7521(a)(1) (2006).
31. Massachusetts v. EPA, 547 U.S. at 533 ("Under the clear terms of the Clean
Air Act, EPA can avoid taking further action only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to
determine whether they do."). Under the Court's holding, it is possible that the
EPA could have tried to withhold its judgment, perhaps by explaining that it
was not going to make or reject an endangerment finding at this time because it
was devoting resources to other concerns. Yet this would have been a difficult
position for the Agency to maintain because of repeated public pronouncements
about the threat of climate change-pronouncements that all but endorsed an
actual endangerment finding.
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compli. After years of Agency pronouncements and studies detailing the potential harms of global warming, on top of studies
by the National Academy of Sciences and other respected authorities, the Agency had little room to claim before the Court
that global warming was not a threat. After Massachusetts v.
EPA, the question of whether the EPA would regulate GHGs
eventually was obviated and replaced only by a question of
when such regulation would take place. 32

II.

ENDANGERMENT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The Obama Administration wasted little time before moving
ahead with GHG regulation. After a notice-and-comment
rulemaking, the EPA made a formal finding on December 15,
2009 that GHG emissions from new motor vehicles caused or
contributed to air pollution that could be reasonably interpreted to endanger public health or welfare. 33 This finding was
the trigger for the regulation of GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under Section 202 of the Act, and mudt else as
well. Once a substance is regulated as a pollutant under one
portion of the Act, other provisions are triggered as well. Still
other provisions of the Clean Air Act contain virtually identical
endangerment language, all but ensuring further regulation of
GHGs tmder the Act once an initial determination of endangerment had been made.
The EPA's endangerment finding will be very difficult to challenge in court. 34 The language of Section 202 is fairly precautionary. The EPA is not required to prove that global warming is
upon us, let alone that it threatens environmental catastrophe.
Nor is tl"le Agency required to show that the net effects of climate
change on human health are negative, or that regulation of GHG
32. This was also the view of EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, who maintained that the EPA was obligated to regulate GHGs in the wake of Massachusetts v. EPA. See Letter from Lisa P. Jackson, Adm'r, EPA, to Sen. Jay Rockefeller
(Feb. 22, 2010), http://epa.gov/oar/pdfs/lpj_letter.pdf ("As a result of the Court's
decision, EPA became obligated to treat greenhouse-gas emissions as air pollution under the Clean Air Act and to engage with the best available science in
determining whether those emissions endanger Americans' health or welfare.").
33. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009)
(final rule).
34. At the time of this writing, several petitions for review have been filed by
various states, trade associations, and anti-regulatory organizations.
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emissions would be worthwhile. Indeed, the Agency is precluded
from considering costs at this stage. All the EPA must show is that
it could reasonably anticipate that global warming thxeatens public health or "welfare," an expansive term that the Act explicitly
defines to include effects on climate, "economic values" and "personal comfort and well-being." 35 Reviewing courts will not substihlte their reading of the relevant scientific evidence for that of the
EPA, so it is also no use arguing that the Agency placed too mucl1.
weight on one study while discounting another. Thus, even if
courts were convinced the threat from anthropogenic warming
was small and that positive effects of a modestly wanner climate
could outweigh any negative effects, it would not justify overhuning the EPA's judgment.
The first immediate consequence of the endangerment finding
was the EPA's adoption of more stringent regulations governing
automotive fuel economy as a means of reducing GHG emissions from new cars and trucks. Because Section 202 provides
that the EPA "shall" promulgate regulations limiting emissions
of regulated pollutants from new cars and trucks once an endangerment finding is made, this regulation was inevitable. On
April 1, 2010, the EPA and the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) promulgated regulations requiring
automal<ers to improve the fuel economy and reduce GHG
emissions from light-duty vehicles (that is, cars and light
tmcks). 36 These mles effectively require automakers to produce
vehicles with an average fuel efficiency of 34.1 miles per gallon
by 2016.37 According to EPA and NHTSA estimates, this will reduce by 2030 light-duty vehicle GHG emissions by approximately 21% compared to a business-as-usual scenario. 38 These
regulations could increase new vehicle prices by $1,000, by the
EPA's own estimates, 39 though this cost could be offset by in-
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35. 42 U.S. C. § 7602(h) (2006) ("All language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not limited to, effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade
materials, animals, wildlife, weather, visibility, and climate, damage to and
deterioration of property, and hazards to transportation, as well as effects on
economic values and on personal comfort and well-being, whether caused by
transformation, conversion, or combination with other air pollutants.").
36. Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate
Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324 (May 7, 2010).
37. Id. at 25,330.
38. Id. at 25,328.
39. Id.
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creased fuel savings. These increased costs also could spur vehicle downsizing, resulting in a negative impact on overall auto
safety. 40 These rules will be followed with additional regulations
governing larger motor vehicles. In November 2010, the EPA
and NHTSA proposed regulations to increase fuel economy and
reduce GHG emissions from medium- and heavy-duty vehicles,
including larger trucks, vans, buses, and tractors. 41
The new fuel economy rules are only the first of several regulatory measures set in motion by the endangerment finding.
Although the EPA made its finding under Section 202, other
provisions of the Act have virtually identical endangerment
language. Section 111, for example, governs emissions for
newly built or modified industrial facilities and likewise requires the Agency to set standards for stationary sources of
emissions that cause or conhi.bute to "air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare."42 If greenhouse gases satisfy the requirements of Section
202, they surely satisfy Section 111 as well.
Section 111 requires that the EPA impose emission control
requirements-"new source performance standards" or
NSPS-for those categories of stationary sources that contribute "significantly" to the air pollution at issue. 43 If the EPA determines that a given category of sources, such as coal-fired
steam turbines, 44 cement kilns, 45 copper smelters,46 or pulp
40. For a discussion of the potential safety consequences of automotive fuel
economy regulations, see Robert W. Crandall & John D. Graham, The Effect of
Fuel Economy Standards on Automobile Safety, 32 J.L. & ECON. 97 (1989).
41. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for
Medium- and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 75 Fed. Reg. 74,152 (Nov. 30,
2010). The regulation covers on-road vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of
8,500 pounds or more, excluding trailers. Id. at 74,153.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 741l(b)(l)(A) (2006) (requiring the Agency to set emission performance standards for stationary sources that "cause[] or contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare").
43. Id. § 741l(f). It should be noted that this section only applies if there is no
National Ambient Air Quality Standard for the emissions in question. Thus,
should the EPA classify carbon dioxide or other GHGs as criteria air pollutants,
as discussed below, infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text, then these provisions would not be in force.
44. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.40a-.46 (2009) (standards of performance for fossil-fuel
fired steam generators for which construction is commenced after August 17, 1971).
45. See id. §§ 60.60-.66 (standards of performance for Portland cement plants).
46. See id. §§ 60.160-.166 (standards of performance for copper smelters).
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mills, 47 contributes "significantly" to the accumulation of GHGs
in the atmosphere, it is required to establish a "standard of performance" that represents the best-demonstrated technology
for reducing emissions from that category of sources, taking
into account the costs of imposing such controls. 48 These controls
must be adopted by new and modified sources witl1in the relevant categories. 49 The EPA also is required to "review and, if appropriate, revise" these standards "at least every 8 years." 50 The
EPA has not yet promulgated NSPS for GHGs for any source
category, but the consideration of such standards is ongoing. 51
In addition, until GHGs are regulated as criteria air pollutants
subject to National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), 52
Section 111 requires the EPA to issue guidelines to states for the
creation of standards for existing sources for which NSPS have
been promulgated. 53 States are required to establish and impose
emission standards for existing sources similar to those the EPA
sets for new and modified sources. In applying these standards
to any given source, however, the state may "take into consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of the existing source to whidt such standard applies." 54 If a state fails to
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47. See id. §§ 60.280-.285 (standards of performance for kraft pulp mills).
48. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(l), (£)(1) (2006) (defining "standard of performance" as
"a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair
quality health and environmental impact and energy requirements) the Administrator determines has been adequately demonstrated").
49. See id. § 741l(b)(l). Although this provision, by its terms, only applies to
"new" sources, Section Ill of the Act defines "new source" to mean "any stationary source, the construction or modification of which is commenced after the
publication of regulations ... prescribing a standard of performance under this
section which will be applicable to such source." ld. § 7411(a)(2) (emphasis
added). This definition aims to discourage regulated entities from extending the
life of existing sources through retrofits and other modifications to avoid the
NSPS requirements for new sources.
50. See id. § 7411(b)(l)(B).
51. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from
the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry and Standards of Performance for
Portland Cement Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 54,970, 54,996-97 (Sept. 9, 2010) (discussing consideration of performance standards for GHGs).
52. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006).
54. See id. § 7411(d)(l)(B).
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adopt an NSPS plan that meets with EPA approval, the Agency
must impose a regulatory plan of its own. 55
A more significant effect of the endangerment finding and
the promulgation of GHG emission controls for new motor vehicles is the triggering of the Clean Air Act's new source review and Title V permitting requirements. Section 165 of the
Act, implemented through Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD)56 provisions, governs so-called "major" stationary
sources of air pollution. 57 Under Section 165, companies are required to adopt emission controls-the "best available control
technology" (BACT)- for all emissions subject to regulation by
any part of the Act if they construct or modify any facility that
qualifies as a "major" stationary source. 58 Construction or
modification of a facility makes it a "new" source for purposes
of this regulation, which is part of what is commonly referred
to as "New Source Review." Older facilities are grandfathered
in, but only so long as they do not make any modifications that
could increase emissions of regulated pollutants. 59 Other related provisions require major sources to file permits demonstrating their regulatory compliance.
The Clean Air Act defines a "major" source for purposes of
the PSD provisions as a facility that emits or has the potential
to emit 250 tons per year of a regulated pollutant, or 100 tons
per year for some specified facilities. 6° For purposes of Title V's
permitting requirements, "major sources" are those facilities
that emit or have the potential to emit over 100 tons per year. 61
For traditional air pollutants, such as sulfur dioxide or nitrogen
oxides, these thresholds mean that only the biggest and dirtiest
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55. See id. § 74ll(d)(2).
56. See EPA, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Basic Information,
EP A.Gov, http://www.epa.gov/NSR/psd.html (last updated Nov. 10, 2010).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006).
58. See id. § 7475(a)(4).
59. This aspect of the New Source Review rules creates a disincentive to modernize and replace older facilities. Insofar as one could expect newer and modified facilities to be more efficient and to emit less per unit of output, grandfathering can
create incentives that are cotmterproductive for pollution control.
60. See id. § 7479(1).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) (2006) adopts the definition provided in id. § 7602(j), defining a "major" source as "any stationary facility or source of air pollutants which
directly emits, or has the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of
any air pollutant." For regulation of hazardous air pollutants, id. § 7661(2) incorporates the even more stringent definition contained in id. § 7412 (2006).
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facilities are subject to federal controls-several thousand facilities nationwide. This is not the case with GHGs, and particularly with carbon dioxide, which is emitted in far greater
quantities than traditional pollutants. Indeed, some efforts to
control traditional pollutants increase carbon dioxide emissions
by design, as increased carbon dioxide emissions are a consequence of more complete combustion. Though many industrial
facilities emit over 250 tons of carbon dioxide per year, so do
many commercial and residential buildings.
Applying the Clean Air Act's stationary source regulation
and permitting provisions to all facilities with the potential to
emit over 250 tons per year of carbon dioxide would cause the
EPA's existing program to explode. According to the EPA:
If PSD and Title V requirements apply at the applicability

levels provided under the CAA, many small sources
would be burdened by the costs of individualized PSD
control technology requirements and permit applications.
In addition, State permitting authorities would be paralyzed by enormous numbers of these permit applications;
the numbers are orders of magnitude greater than the current inventory of permits and would vastly exceed the current administrative resources of the permitting authorities. 62

The precise number of facilities that would be subject to these
regulatory requirements is unclear, but there is no question that it
would be substantial. In proposing to impose its regulatory controls on GHG emissions, the EPA estimated that a strict application of Section 165 would increase the number of required air
pollution permits "more than 140-fold." 63 According to the EPA,
the number of facilities required to submit PSD applications
would increase from 280 per year to over 40,000 per year. 64 The
number of facilities subject to Title V permitting requirements
would increase from approximately 15,000 to about six rnillion. 65

1-

l-

n

nch

of
10-

62. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 74 Fed. Reg. 55,292, 55,294 (Oct. 27, 2009) [hereinafter GHG Tailoring
Rule] (proposed rule).
63. Id. at 55,301 (2009).
64. Id. If anything, this is a conservative estimate, as it is only based upon a
250-tons-per-year threshold and does not include those facilities subject to a 100
tons-per-year threshold.
65. I d. at 55,295.

[Vol. 34

Nc

This explosion in regulatory requirements would burden
both the public and private sectors. Processing just one permit
for a new or modified industrial source can require over 300
person-hours for a regulatory agency, and can cost the facility
seeking the permit several hundred thousand dollars. 66 Permitting residential and commercial buildings should be less difficult, but is still estimated to require approximately sixty
person-hours per permit. 67 As a consequence, the EPA estimates that applying the PSD requirements to GHGs would cost
regulatory agencies over $250 million per year. 68 The costs of
applying Title V's permitting requirements are even greater.
Even assuming that most Title V permits can be processed
quickly and require fewer than forty-five person-hours, the
"massive influx" of six million permit applications "would
overwhelm permitting authorities' administrative resources." 69
According to the EPA, "the total nationwide additional burden
for permitting authorities for Title V permits from adding GHG
emissions at the 100-tpy threshold would be 340 million hours,
which would cost over $15 billion." 70
As incredible as it may seem, the EPA's estimate of the costs
of applying the Clean Air Act to "major" stationary sources
may be too conservative. A study commissioned by the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce estimated that the 250-ton threshold
would encompass over one million businesses nationwide. 71
Based upon an analysis of sector-specific energy use data from
the Energy Information Association and the U.S. Census, the
Chamber of Commerce study concluded that nearly 200,000
manufacturing facilities, approximately 20,000 farms, and at
least one million commercial buildings would be covered, including a substantial percentage of hospitals, hotels, and large
restaurants. 72 Even 10% of churches and other places of worship could qualify. The Chamber study reported that on aver-
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Id. at 55,301.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 55,302.
70. Id.
66.
67.
68.
69.

71. See U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, A REGULATORY BURDEN: THE
COMPLIANCE DIMENSION OF REGULATING C02 AS A POLLUTANT 3 (2008), available at http://www.uschamber.com/co2.
72. Id.
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age "a building with over 40,000 square feet uses enough hydrocarbons to become a regulated source." 73
Because the EPA knows the regulatory nightmare and political backlash that enforcing Section 165 could create, the Agency
has proposed to "tailor" its GHG regulation to limit its applicability. In September 2009, the EPA proposed to set a new threshold of 25,000 tons per year for the imposition of these
requirements, even though the statute sets an express limit of
250. 74 Under this proposed threshold, the EPA estimates that
fewer than 15,000 facilities would need to obtain permits for
their greenhouse gas emissions, most of which are already subject to New Source Review regulation for other emissions.75 EPA
Administrator Lisa Jackson explained that the proposal was a
"common sense rule that is carefully tailored to apply to only the
largest sources." 76 Although a commonsensical approach, the
regulatory proposal was at odds with the plain text of the act.77
Nonetheless, Administrator Jackson signaled her willingness to
adopt an even more elastic reading of the statute if necessary. 78
The EPA justified its elastic reading of the Act on the ground
that a lower threshold is not feasible for greenhouse gases.
There is no statutmy text to support this decision, and so the
EPA relied on the doctrines of "administrative necessity" and
of avoidance of "absurd results." 79 According to the EPA, applying the Clean Air Act as written to greenhouse gas emissions would "extensively disrupt" existing regulatory
programs, and perhaps make them "impossible" to administer.80 Yet the EPA was not able to identify any case in which
something as clear as a numerical statutory threshold was cast
aside because of concerns about implementation. Indeed, it is
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73. Id. at 11. See also Reitze, Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra
note 28, at 1302 (summarizing industry estimates of the number of facilities
subject to PSD for greenhouse gas emissions).
74. See GHG Tailoring Rule, supra note 62, at 55,292.
75. Id. at 55,295.
76. Press Release, EPA, New EPA Rule Will Require Use of Best Technologies
to Reduce Greenhouse Gases from Large Facilities/Small Businesses and Farms
Exempt (Sept. 30, 2009).
77. As the EPA acknowledged in its notice of the proposed rule, "the applicability provisions for PSD and Title V are clear on their face." GHG Tailoring
Rule, supra note 62, at 55,306.
78. See generally Letter from Lisa P. Jackson to Jay Rockefeller, supra note 32.
79. GHG Tailoring Rule, supra note 62, at 55,303-20.
80. Id. at 55,303-05.
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common for Congress to enact statutory requirements that
agencies lack the resources to fulfill and to which courts do not
afford relief. In this specific case, however, the Clean Air Act's
text is explicit, and the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA
expressly rejected the EPA's claims that applying the Act to
GHGs would be impossible or unadministrable. 81
The EPA's final tailoring rule backed even further away from
the express text of the Clean Air Act. 82 This rule creates new
temporary thresholds for the applicability of Section 165 and
Title V of the Clean Air Act that will change over time. For the
first six months of 2011, GHG-permitting requirements will
only apply to those stationary sources already subject to the
PSD program, and BACT will only be required for those already-regulated facilities that increase their GHG emissions by
75,000 tons per year or more. 83 From July 2011 through June
2013, the permitting requirements will be extended to new construction projects that emit 100,000 tons or more of GHGs per
year and to modifications that increase GHG emissions by
75,000 tons or more per year. 84 At the same time, the EPA announced that sometime in 2011 it will begin another rulemaking-to be completed in 2012-that will consider whether to
extend the requirements to those facilities emitting 50,000 tons
or more of GHGs per year. 85 Facilities emitting less than 50,000
tons per year, however, will not be subject to BACT or Title V
requirements prior to April30, 2016, at the earliest. 86
According to the EPA, this represents a "common sense"
approach to imposing regulatory requirements on stationary
sources. 87 The problem for the EPA is that there is no basis for
this timetable in the Act, nor does the statute delegate to the

81. See 549 U.S. 497, 533-34 (2007).
82. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (final rule).
83. Id. at 31,516.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Some would argue there can be no "common sense" approach to climate
change under the PSD provisions as they only impose controls on new and
modified sources. Focusing exclusively on such sources makes it "impossible to
have a least-cost solution" and creates an incentive to keep older, heavier emitting sources online longer. See Craig N. Oren, Is the Clean Air Act at a Crossroads?, 40 ENVTL. L. 1231, 1245-46 (2010).
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EPA the authority necessary to develop such a scheme. The
EPA maintains that applying the numerical thresholds expressly provided for in the statute is not feasible for GHGs
because they are emitted in much higher volumes than traditionally regulated pollutants. Although the EPA is likely correct on this point, this does not give it license to rewrite the Act
or to shift the decimal point on a pollution threshold everrightward until only a politically acceptable number of facilities are subject to regulation.
Although the EPA's interpretation creates a reprieve for
thousands of facilities that would otherwise be subject to GHG
regulation under the Act, its adoption increases the Agency's
discretionary authority. If it may revise the numerical emission
thresholds established in the Clean Air Act in response to temporary political or economic concerns, then the Agency is the
master of its domain and it is the Agency, not Congress, that
effectively determines the scope of its own authority. 88 Thus,
even while eschewing the imposition of regulatory controls on
large portions of the economy, the Agency is expanding its authority and loosening the statutory reins imposed by Congress .
At the same time, the EPA is increasing its authority vis-a-vis
state agencies over GHG regulation, at least where the Agency
fears that states will be insufficiently aggressive. Under the
"cooperative federalism" model embodied in the Clean Air Act
and most major federal environmental statutes, the PSD and
Title V regulatory requirements are implemented largely by
state environmental agencies, subject to EPA oversight. 89 Yet
the EPA is concerned about state implementation of these programs as applied to GHG emissions. As a consequence, shortly
after promulgating the tailoring rule, the EPA put several states

10use Gas Tailor-

proach to climate
rols on new and
; it "impossible to
der, heavier emitlir Act at a Cross-

88. For a lengthy discussion of why courts should not presume Congress has
delegated agencies discretion to determine the scope of their own jurisdiction,
and thus should not give Chevron deference where the scope of agency jurisdiction is at issue, see Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is
Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1497, 1532-63.
89. See Jonathan H. Adler, When Is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action on
State Environmental Regulation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 67,87 (2007) (summarizing the "cooperative federalism" approach to environmental regulation).
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on notice that they would not have EPA authorization to implement these programs for GHGs. 90
Regulating GHGs under the applicable source-specific portions of the Act is difficult enough for the EPA as is, but that is
only one of the EPA's many obligations now that the endangerment finding has been made. In all likelihood, the EPA will also
need to begin treating carbon dioxide and other GHGs as criteria
air pollutants, triggering another set of regulatory requirements.
Under Section 108 of the Act, the EPA Administrator is required to create a list of criteria air pollutants that includes "each
air pollutant ... emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare" that is emitted into the
ambient air by "numerous or diverse mobile or stationary
sources."91 This endangerment standard is practically indistinguishable from that in Section 202. The only potential distinction
is additional language in Section 108 providing that the pollutant in question must be one for which the EPA Administtator
"plans to issue air quality criteria under this section."92 There is
little reason, however, to believe that the EPA could refuse to
regulate greenhouse gases on this basis. In fact, this argument
was flatly rejected by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit over thirty years ago in Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Train. 93 The EPA argued that it could choose not to include
lead as a criteria air pollutant because it did not plan to issue air
quality criteria on lead and there were more cost-effective means
of controlling lead emissions. 94 The Second Circuit found the
former argument wholly unpersuasive and the latter irrelevant
given the text of the Act. As the rationale would apply equally to
carbon dioxide, the EPA's argument must fail unless NRDC v.
Train is overmled or othetwise legally modified. 95
Under Section 109, once a pollutant is listed the EPA must
develop a criteria document and establish NAAQS for the pol-

90. Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Rules on Clean Air Act Permitting for
Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Aug. 12, 2010).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1) (2006).
92. Id. § 7408(a)(1)(C).
93. 545 F.2d 320, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1976).
94. Id. at 324.
95. Some scholars argue that NRDC v. Train was wrongly decided and "is of
limited authority." See Oren, supra note 87, at 1252-53.
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lutant. 96 Once the NAAQS is in place, Section 110 requires
states to submit State Implementation Plans (SIPs) to ensure
that every metropolitan area in the nation meets the requirements.97 Here is where the difficulties would begin, because the
SIP process was designed for controlling localized, ambient
pollution problems, not protecting the global atmosphere. 98 The
problem with trying to set a NAAQS for GHGs is that it simply
makes no sense. 99 There is no way for state and local regulators
to ensure that individual cities, or even larger regions, meet an
air-quality standard for a globally dispersed atmospheric pollutant. Local emissions could be reduced to zero, and a given
area would still violate the NAAQS if global emissions had not
declined. It would be a pointless regulatory exercise.
The EPA might argue that the NAAQS regulatory regime is
fundamentally ill-suited to GHG control. The Agency would
have a point, albeit one rejected by the Massachusetts v. EPA majority. The meaningful measure of GHG pollution levels is their
concentration in the global atmosphere, not the locally ambient
air. There is nothing any given jurisdiction can do to comply
with a NAAQS for carbon dioxide unless emissions are controlled worldwide. No state could possibly meet a GHG NAAQS
set in accordance with the Act's requirements. Nonetheless, the
Massachusetts v. EPA majority explicitly rejected the idea that
recognizing GHGs as pollutants under the CAA would produce
any unintuitive or illogical results, 100 so this argument is foreclosed. At best, state failure to submit acceptable plans would
eventually lead to tl1.e adoption of a Federal Implementation
Plan under Section 179, 101 after years of litigation.1°2

96. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2006).
97. Id. § 7410.
98. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007).
99. Indeed, even some environmentalist organizations claim to oppose this
approach. See Oren, supra note 87, at 1246 ("Then-counsel for the Sierra Club
has said he would join industry in opposing the use of the ambient standard
system" for greenhouse gas emission control.).
100. 549 u.s. 497, 530 (2007).
101. 42 U.S. C. § 7509.
102. Jonathan Wiener, Climate Policy After Mass v. EPA, THE FACULTY BLOG
(Apr. 3, 2007, 2:24PM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2007/04/climate
_policy_.html.
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The EPA may be in no hurry to develop a GHG NAAQS, but
environmentalist groups could force the Agency's hand. On December 2, 2009, for instance, the Center for Biological Diversity
(CBD) filed a petition with the EPA demandil1.g that the EPA
adopt a GHG NAAQS.l 03 It was a petition of just this sort that set
the greenhouse regulatory train in motion, and the CBD is more
than ready to file suit if the EPA does not comply. If successful,
the CBD will force the EPA to bring the full force of the Clean
Air Act down on GHG emissions, and the resulting increase in
regulatory expenditure in time and money will be substantial.
III.

SPREADING REGULATORY HEAT

Not all of the new regulatory initiatives to address the threat
of climate change are related to the Clean Air Act. The EPA and
other federal agencies have also begun to use additional sources
of regulatory authority to control GHG emissions or otherwise
address climate change concems.l 04 Some states, most notably
California, have also sought to begin regulatil1.g GHGs, 1os and
various states and environmentalist organizations still seek to
use the courts to encourage or induce further regulatory efforts.
Even beyond the confines of the Clean Air Act, the EPA is
the primary regulatory agency concerned with climate change.
Among the Obama Administration's first climate-related regulatory initiatives was a mandatory reporting requirement for
GHG emissions for industrial facilities and other large emission
sources. In a regulation that became effective on December 29,
2009, the EPA required reporting by any facility responsible for
emissions of 25,000 tons per year or more of GHGs, as well as
by firms in certain specified industries. 106 Although the regulation concerns emissions of GHGs il1.to the air, the regulation

103. Petition from the Center for Biological Diversity to Lisa P. Jackson,
Adm'r, Environmental Protection Agency, Petition To Establish National Pollution Limits for Greenhouse Gases Pursuant to the Clean Air Act (Dec. 2, 2009).
104. See Margaret Kriz Hobson, A Change of Weather, NAT'L J., Dec. 19, 2009, at
36 (reporting on the Obama Administration's "government-wide strategy of
acknowledging and attempting to curb global warming").
105. See, e.g., Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB32), CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE§§ 38500-38599 (West 2010).
106. The regulation also requires firm-wide reporting in certain industries, including vehicle and engine manufacturers and some fossil fuel suppliers. See
Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260 (Oct. 30, 2009).
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was not adopted under the Clean Air Act. Rather, the authority
for the reporting requirement was provided by the FY2008
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 107 signed into law by President George W. Bush in December 2007. 108
Although one might not think of climate change as a water pollution problem, this might not stop climate-related regulation under the Clean Water Act. 1D9 In December 2007, the CBD petitioned
the EPA to revise federal water quality criteria for marine pH levels in response to ocean acidification that could be caused by increased atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide. Tite EPA agreed to
respond to this petition in January 2009. 110 The Obama Administration subsequently settled a related lawsuit and issued a
memorandum calling upon states to take ocean acidification into
account in state water quality programs. 111 Specifically, the EPA
determined that states should identify those coastal waters impaired by ocean acidification, a step that could lead to more stringent pollution control requirements under other portions of the
Clean Water Act and delegated state programs. 112
TI1e EPA also moved to give states more leeway to regulate
GHG emissions, at least so long as states seek to be more stringent
than the federal government. In December 2005, the California Air
Resources Board (CARB) applied to the EPA for a waiver of preemption under the Clean Air Act for regulations that CARB
sought to impose on motor vehicle GHG emissions. 113 During the
Bush Administration, the EPA denied California's request, citing
a preference for nationally applicable regulation of motor vehicle
107. See H.R. 2764, Pub. L No. 110-161, 121 Stat. 1844, 2128 (2007).
108. See Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,260,
56,264 (Oct. 30, 2009).
109. See Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change Comes to the Clean Water Act: Now
What?, 1 WASH & LEE}. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV'T 9 (2010).
110. See Letter from Benjamin H. Grumbles, Asst. Adm'r, EPA, to Ms. Miyoko Sakashita, Ctr. for Biological Diversity (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/
campaigns/ocean_acidilication/pdfs/EPA_Response_to_CBD_Ocean_Acidilication_
Petition. pdf.
111. Memorandum from Denise Keehner, Director, Office of Wetlands,
Oceans and Watersheds, EPA, to the Water Division Directors, Regions 1-10,
Integrated Reporting and Listing Decisions Related to Ocean Acidification
(Nov. 15, 2010).
.
112. See, e.g., Craig, supra note 109, at 30 (discussing how impairment due to
ocean acidification could result in more stringent National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit requirements).
113. See Letter from Cal. Air. Res. Bd. to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, EPA
(Dec. 21, 2005).

442

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 34

emissions. 114 Immediately upon taking office, President Obama
instructed the EPA to reconsider its prior decision. 115 TI1e waiver
was formally granted six months later, authorizing California,
and other states by extension, to adopt more stringent motor vehicle GHG controls than the federal govemment. 1I6
Although the EPA is responsible for most climate change related federal regulatory initiatives, it is not alone. Under the
Obama Administration a number of other agencies have begun to
implement measures to address GHG emissions. 117 For example,
in October 2009, President Obama issued Executive Order 13514
requiring all federal agencies to reduce their GHG emissions and
improve their environmental performance.l 18 Among other
things, this order required all federal agencies to set a GHG emission reduction target for 2020, to reduce vehicle fleet petroleum
use by 30% by 2020, and implement a "net-zero-energy" building
requirement by 2030.I 19 President Obama also directed the Department of Energy to set more stringent energy efficiency standards for appliances, including both commercial equipment and
residential products, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005.12°
The Council on Environmental Quality is another culprit, having promulgated draft guidance on the "Consideration of the Ef. fects of Climate Change and Greenhouse Gas Emissions" under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEP A).l 21 This guidance
outlines how federal agencies must evaluate and consider the po-

114. See Letter from Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, EPA, to Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Governor, Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf. For
a discussion of the legal and policy issues surrounding California's waiver request, see
generally Jonathan H. Adler, Hothouse Flowers: The Vices and VirhLes of Climate Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & Crv. RTS. L. REV. 443 (2008).
115. See John M. Broder & Peter Baker, Obama's Order Likely to Tighten Auto
Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009, at Al.
116. Press Release, EPA, EPA Grants California GHG Waiver Oune 30, 2009),
http://yosernite.epa.govI opal admpress.nsf/bd 43 79a92ceceeac8525735900400c27I
5e448236de5fb369852575e500568e1b!OpenDocument. For a fuller discussion of
the legal and policy issues raised by California's request for a waiver of preemption, see Adler, supra note 114, at 453-62.
117. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 5, at 39-75.
118. Exec. Order No. 13,514, 74 Fed. Reg. 52,117 (Oct. 8, 2009).
119. Id. at 52,117-19.
120. Memorandum from Barack Obama, President, to the Sec'y of Energy, Appliance Efficiency Standards (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
ApplianceEfficiencyStandards/.
121. 75 Fed. Reg. 8,046 (Feb. 23, 2010).
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tential climate change impacts and resulting GHG emissions of
significant federal actions subject to regulation under NEPA. 122
The Interior Department launched a "coordinated strategy"
to address the impact of climate change on lands and waters
managed by agencies within the Department. 123 Secretarial Order No. 3289 created, among other things, a "Climate Change
Response Council" that will require each bureau and office
within the Department to incorporate climate change concerns
into Agency management plans and decision-making, including "major decisions regarding potential use of resources under
the Department's purview ." 124 In addition, Secretarial Order
No. 3285 ."prioritized development of renewable energy on
public lands and offshore waters to reduce our dependence on
foreign oil and to reduce greenhouse gas pollution." 125 The Interior Department is responsible for managing approximately
20% of the nation's land, in addition to large portions of the
Outer Continental Shel£. 126 The Forest Service is also considering how climate change concems should alter its management
of national forests. 127
The Fish and Wildlife Service designated 187,000 square miles
of u on-shore barrier islands, denning areas and offshore sea-ice"
as critical habitat for polar bears, which are listed as a threatened
species. 128 The Endangered Species Act requires federal agencies
to consult with the Service when undertaking, funding, or permitting actions that could adversely critical habitat.l 29
Finally, the SEC decided by a three-to-two vote to issue an interpretive guidance for public companies on how the SEC's dis-
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122. Id.
123. See Secretarial Order No. 3,289, Addressing the Impacts of Climate
Change on America's Water, Land, and Other Natural and Cultural Resources
(Dep't of the Interior Sept. 14, 2009) [hereinafter Order No. 3,289].
124. Id. at 2-3.
125. See id. at 3; see also Secretarial Order No. 3285, Renewable Energy Development by the Department of the Interior (Dep't of the Interior Mar. 11, 2009).
126. See Juliet Eilperin, Interior Launches Climate Strategy, WASH. POST, Sept. 15,
2009, at A3 ("Interior manages one-fifth of the nation's land mass and nearly 1.7
billion acres on the Outer Continental Shelf.").
127. See Hobson, supra note 104, at 37.
128. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, U.S. Fish and Wildlife S~rvice Announces Final Designation of Polar Bear Critical Habitat (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/US-Fish-and-Wildlife-ServiceAnnounces-Final-Designation-of-Polar-Bear-Critical-Habitat.cfm.
129. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).
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closure requirements apply to economic and legal risks relating to
climate cl1.ange. The SEC concluded that public companies may
have an obligation to disclose risks associated with proposed climate change legislation, regulation, and international agreements,
the indirect economic consequences of such regulation, and potentially material impacts of climate change on their business. 130
These measures, in addition to the regulatory mandates underway at the EPA, represent a dramatic assertion of federal
regulatory authority to address the threat of climate change.
The Administration is utilizing in this effort virtually every
policy lever it can reach. The question, though, is whether all of
this federal regulatory activity will make a meaningful difference in addressing the threat of climate change.
IV.

THE FUTILITY OF FEDERAL REGULATION

Federal efforts to control GHG emissions may be in full gear,
but they are far from sufficient to meet the Administration's
stated "80 by 50" goal and will do little to reduce the risks of
global climate change. Existing environmental statutes were not
designed to control GHG emissions and are not well-suited to
achieve state climate policy goals. More stringent regulatory
measures are not the answer either. Even dramatic near-tomedium tenn reductions in GHG emissions from the United
States will fail to reduce the buildup of GHGs in the atmosphere.
Unless atmospheric concentrations are controlled, global warming will continue apace.
Regulation of GHG emissions under the Clean Air Act, as discussed above, will impose a wide range of regulatory burdens
throughout the economy, but is unlikely to come anywhere close
to the aspirational goal of reducing emissions 80% by 2050. This is
made clear when one looks at the projected or likely emissions
reductions from various regulatory measures, none of which
come close to acluevin.g 80% reductions for covered facilities or
teclmologies. New regulations on light-duty motor vehicles are
expected to reduce automotive GHG emissions by 21% by 2030-

130. Corrunission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Se- .
curities Act Release No. 9106, Exchange Act Release No. 61,649, 75 Fed. Reg. 6,290
(Feb. 8, 2010).
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only 25% of the needed reduction in the first twenty years. 131 Application of NSPS to coal-fired power plants could produce up to
10% GHG emission reductions from those sources, according to
one recent analysisP2 As coal-fired power plants are responsible
for nearly one-third of GHG emissions in the United States, this
would represent a 3% reduction in aggregate GHG emissions133 a tiny portion of the proposed 80% reduction of the Obama Administration. Other analyses suggest that this estimate is overly
optimistic, and that NSPS is unlikely to reduce GHG emissions by
more than 5% from existing facilities. 134 If the 80 by 50 goal is to be
achieved, insufficient emission reductions in one sector will need
to be made up elsewhere. Yet there does not appear to be any sector subject to EPA regulation capable of achieving emission reductions in excess of the 80 by 50 target.
The House-passed climate legislation endorsed by the
Obama Administration would have substantially expanded
federal regulation even further, without solving the climate
policy challenge. By one estimate, it would have required
nearly 150 federal agency rulemakings. 135 Another analysis of
the bill concluded that it required the EPA's Administrator "to
perform over 600 tasks in connection with the operation of the
law," and created responsibilities for eleven more federal agencies and departments, in addition to "multiple planning and
reporting mandates for state govenLments." 136 Despite all this
regulatory effort, however, the bill would not have achieved its
stated goal of reducing GHG emissions by 80%, 137 let alone
have stemmed anthropogenic global warming.
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131. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 25,324, 25,328
(May 7, 2010).
132. See NATHAN RICHARDSON ET AL., GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION UNDER THE
CLEAN A1R Acr: STRUO'URE, EFFEO'S, AND IMPUCATIONS OF A KNOWABLE PATHWAY
36 (2010), avaz1able at www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-10-23.pdf.
133. Id. at 35, 44.
134. See Franz T. Litz & Nicholas M. Bianco, What to Expect from EPA: Regulation of Greenlwuse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10480,
10482 tbl.II (2010).
135. See E. Donald Elliott, Lessons from Implementing the 1990 CAA Amendments,
40 ENVTL. L. REP. 10592 (2010).
136. See Steven F. Hayward & Kenneth P. Green, Waxman-Markey: An Exercise
in Unreality, AEI ENERGY & ENV'T OUTLOOK 2, July 2009, at 2.
137. See id.; Jesse Jenkins, Analysis of Waxman-Markey ACES Climate Bill: Full Breakthrough Institute Collection, BREAK1HROUGH BLOG Gune 26, 2009, 12:15 AM),
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The unforhmate reality is that the 80 by 50 target is unrealistic
given existing and projected technologies. Reducing emissions by
80% below 2005 levels requires reducing emissions to their lowest
point in a century.I38 Specifically, it means reducing emissions to
the approximate level of 1910, when the nation's population
was only ninety-two million people and per capita income was
below $6,200.139 By 2050, however, the population of the United
States is expected to exceed 400 million, meaning that per capita emissions would need to be more than 75% below their 1910
level-somewhere in the neighborhood of 2.4 tons of carbondioxide-equivalent per year-or to levels not seen since the end
of Reconstruction. 140 Even nations that derive much of their
electricity from carbon-free sources, such as nuclear power,
come nowhere close to this level.l41 2.4 tons per year is slightly
less than the per capita GHG emissions of nations such as Grenada and Botswana.l42
Even if the 80 by 50 goal were readily achievable through
regulatory impositions, it would still be insufficient to stem
the accumulation of GHGs in the atmosphere. The goal of atmospheric stabilization requires global action. Emissions from
all around the globe contribute to the buildup of GHGs in the
atmosphere, and it is the global atmospheric concentration of
GHGs that drives climate change. Emissions in the United
States could fall to zero and the climate problem would still not
be solved if emissions continue to increase elsewhere. Indeed,
even if all Western developed nations eliminated all net GHG

http://thebreakthrough.org/blog/2009/06/aces_analysis_full_breakthroug.shhnl. In
most existing cap-and-trade programs credits "are heavily over-allocated and allow
excessive banking of credits, undermining their effectiveness in achieving
meaningful emission reductions." Teresa B. Clemmer, Staving Off the Climate
Crisis: The Sectoral Appraoch Under the Clean Air Act, 40 ENVTL. L. 1125, 1137-38
(2010); see also Lesley K. McAllister, The Overallocation Problem in Cap-and-Trade:
Moving Toward Stringency, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 395 (2009).
138. See Hayward & Green, supra note 136, at 3.
139. Id. (per capita income in 2008 dollars). Hayward and Green's calculations
are based upon Department of Energy data.
140. Id.
141. France generates approximately 80% of its electricity with nuclear power,
has much higher population density than the United States, and still has per
capita emissions of over 6.5 tons per year. Id. at 3-4.
142. Id. at 4.
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emissions tomorrow, atmospheric concentrations would continue to climb for decades. 143
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, agreed to in 1992, established the goal of stabilizing atmospheric concenh·ations of greenhouse gases at a level that
avoids "dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system." 144 Although this level is not defined anywhere, it is accepted generally that the framework required stabilizing atmospheric concenh·ations to a level between 450 and 550 parts per
million (ppm), if not lower, so as to avoid an average global
temperature increase of two degrees Celsius. 145 Meeting such a
goal would require more than marginal reductions in emissions
from existing technologies. It would require truly revolutionary
technological changes. 146 Simply allowing existing infrastructure
to remain in place, even while stopping all additional develop-
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143. See lNT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2008, at 48 (2008)
(showing atmospheric GHG concentrations would still rise above 450ppm by
mid-century even if OECD member nation emissions are excluded).
144. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, May 9,
1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
145. See, e.g., S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Current
Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCI. 968, 968
(2004) ("Proposals to limit atmospheric C02 to a concentration that would prevent most damaging climate change have focused on a goal of 500 +/- 50 parts
per million (ppm), or less than double the preindustrial concentration of 280
ppm."). Some environmentalist organizations advocate a significantly lower
target of 350 ppm, which would require even more ambitious measures. See
Andrew C. Revkin, Campaign Against Emissions Picks Number, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
24, 2009, at AS. See generally 350.0RG, http://www.350.org.
146. See, e.g., John Alic et al., Opinion, A New Strategy for Energy Innovation,
466 NATURE 316, 316 (2010) ("Limiting the concentration of carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gases in Earth's atmosphere requires a technological and economic revolution."); Scott Barrett, The Coming Global Climate-Tec/mology Revolution, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 53 (2009) (arguing that "stabilizing concentrations
will require a technological revolution-a 'revolution' because it will require
fundamental change, achieved within a relatively short period of time"); Martin
I. Hoffert et al., Advanced Technology Paths to Global Climate Stability: EnergJJ for a
Greenhouse Planet, 298 SCI. 981, 981 (2002) ("Arguably, the most effective way to
reduce C02 emissions with economic growth and equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology of energy production, distribution, storage,
and conversion."). The cl1.allenge could be even greater than generally assumed,
as it is possible that conventional estimates already incorporate unrealistic assumptions about the rate of emission-reducing technological change in business-as-usual scenarios. See Roger Pielke Jr., Tom Wigley & Christopher Green,
Dangerous Assumptions, 452 NATURE 531, 531 (2008).
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ment, would be enough by itself to approach the 450 ppm lower
bound. 147 And stopping global development is not an option.
GHG emissions have continued to increase with economic
growth, despite gains in energy efficiency. For example, global
emissions of carbon dioxide from fuel combustion increased
38% between 1990 and 2007.1 48 Emissions in developing nations
are climbing particularly rapidly in conjunction with muchneeded economic development. In 2008, nearly 1.5 billion people around the world lacked access to electricity, including 809
million in Asia. 149 For affected nations, electrification is understandably a greater priority than emissions reduction. India
and China, the first and fourth leading emitters of GHG, are
essential to any atmospheric stabilization plan and yet have
made clear that they will not participate in any regime that
would require them to forego future economic growth. 150
Because the atmosphere is a global commons, no country has
much incentive to reduce its own emissions without the assurance that other nations will follow suit. 151 Worse, those countries most essential to the control of global emissions-the
United States and China in particular-have the least incentive
to act.l 52 Although some cmmtries may be willing to enact environmental policies for the benefit of other nations because it is
the "right thing" to do, the more expensive such measures are
147. See Stephen J. Davis, Ken Caldeira & H. Damon Matthews, Future C02
Emissions and Climate Change from Existing Energtj Infrastructure, 329 Scr. 1330,
1330 (2010).
148. See INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, C02 EMISSIONS FROM FUEL COMBUSTION:
HIGHLIGHTS 44 (2010), available at http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/
C02highlights. pdf.
149. See Access to Electricity, IEA.ORG, http://www.iea.org/weo/electricity.asp
(last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
150. According to Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, "[d]eveloping countries
cannot and will not compromise on development." See L. Barber, Transcript: Wen Jia-_
baa, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/795d2bca-f0fe-lldd-87900000779fd2ac.html ("[I]t's difficult for China to take quantified emission reduction
quotas at the Copenhagen conference, because this country is still at an early stage of
development."); Ravi Nessman, India: Climate Deal Can't Sacrifice Poor Nations,
GUARDIAN (UK), Oct. 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8767757;
see also Robert W. Halm, Climate Polictj: Separating Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 557, 564 (2009) (arguing that "there is no simple way to get major developing
countries, sudt as India and Ollila, to participate in an agreement").
151. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 So. 1243 (1968).
152. See Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 1675, 1676-77 (2008).
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likely to be, the less likely it is that any individual nation will
take such autonomous action. Even assuming a degree of nonself-interested behavior in international affairs, there is a limit
to how great a cost individual nations will bear for the benefits
of other nations or the world at large.153
If planet-wide GHG emission reductions are to be achieved, the
cost of emission reductions will have to decline dramatically.
Western developed nations have shown themselves unwilling to
implement costly emission control policies, and developing nations are even more resistant to sacrificing economic growth to
forestall projected climate changes. The international phase-out of
chlorofluorocarbons under the Montreal Protocol was not agreed
to until after it became economical to do so. 154 Climate change is a
far more difficult, and more costly, problem. The reality is that
"when policies focused on economic growth confront policies focused on emissions reductions, it is economic growth that will
win out every time." 155 Unless and until it becomes easier-and
far less costly-to meet the world's economic and development
needs while controlling GHG emissions, meaningful emission
reductions will not happen.
V.

PLOTIING AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE

Reducing net emissions so as to reduce atmospheric GHG concentrations, while maintaining economic growth and expanding
access to energy for those in developing nations, carmot be
achieved with existing or readily foreseeable technologies. 156 According to a recent report of the National Academy of Sciences,
atmospheric stabilization "will require scientific and engineering
genius to create new energy systems that avoid emitting all but a

Jping countries

1script: Wen Jiaf0fe-11dd-8790>sion reduction
n early stage of
!

Poor Nations,

larticle/8767757;
-IARV. ENvTL. L.
ajor developing
:::I. 1243 (1968).

l1ina? The Comrs, 55 UCLA L.

153. See Hahn, supra note 150, at 576 ("[D]omestic energy politics will constrain
the approacl1es that particular countries will take to reducing emissions.").
154. See Cass R. Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007).
155. PJELKE, supra note 10, at 46.
156. See Jason Scott Johnson, A Looming Policy Disaster, REG., Fall 2008, at 40
("[R]eally large reductions in greenhouse gas emissions depend upon the widespread adoption of new teclmologies that are either not yet teclmologically and
economically feasible-most prominently carbon capture and sequestration -or
whose large-scale implementation possibilities are seemingly inherently limited
and are at best unclear .... ").
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small fraction of today' s GHGs while simultaneously powering
global economic growth."Is7
Centralized federal regulation is a poor match for the climate
policy challenge. Regulatory requirements may work tolerably
well at mandating the diffusion and adoption of viable technologies, but command-and-control regulation has a poor record of driving technological advancement in a desired
direction, particularly where revolutionary innovations are required.158 Market-based regulatory systems, including cap-andtrade systems, have not fared much better. The Clean Air Act's
acid rain program may well have reduced the cost of reducing
sulfur dioxide emissions through the use of a tradable permit
mechanism, but the program did not significantly drive technological innovation. 159 The program's emissions reduction targets were "well within the range of capabilities of existing
technology," an_d thus did more to encourage diffusion of pollution control innovations that were already available.I 60
If the United States and other nations are to have any hope of
stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of GHGs at a desirable
level, dramatic tedmological innovation is required. Therefore,
climate policy efforts should focus, first and foremost, on spurring and facilitating precisely that type of innovation. Such regulatory mandates being pursued by the EPA under the Clean Air
Act divert limited public and private resources and emphasize
measures that provide few climate mitigation benefits.
A climate policy focused on technological innovation would
eschew regulatory mandates while creating incentives for innovation and accelerating the diffusion of low-carbon tech-
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157. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., LIMITING THE FUTURE MAGNITUDE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE, at ix (2010). See also Hoffert et al., supra note 146, at 981 ("Arguably,
the most effective way to reduce C02 emissions with economic growth and equity is to develop revolutionary changes in the technology of energy production, distribution, storage, and conversion.").
158. See Jonathan H. Adler, Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 35-42 (2011).
159. See David M. Driesen, An Environmental Competition Statute, in BEYOND
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: POLICY PROPOSALS FOR A BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL
FUTURE 175-76 (Alyson C. Flournoy & David M. Driesen eds., 2010).
160. Lee Lane, The Green Movement and the Challenge of Climate Change, AEI ENERGY
AND ENV'T OUTLOOK, Feb. 2009, at 3; Anne E. Smith, Jeremy Platt & A. Denny Ellerman, The Costs of Reducing Utility S02 Emissions-Not as Low as You Might Think (Ctr.
for Energy and Envtl. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 98010, 1998).
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nologies. Such a policy agenda might include some of the following elements:
• Technology-Inducement Prizes: A more promising means
of encouraging technological innovation than traditional ex ante R&D grants is the endowment of large financial prizes for those who develop technologies
capable of meeting identifiable climate-related needs,
such as more powerful battery and power storage technologies, more efficient and reliable forms of renewable
energy, more energy efficient infrastructure, and less
costly carbon sequestration technologies. 161
• Reducing Barriers to Alternative Energy Sources: New
technologies often face sizable regulatory hurdles.
This is as true with renewable energy sources as it has
been with nuclear power. Proposed development of
off-shore wind farms, tidal power, and other low- or
zero-carbon energy sources have been delayed and
made more costly by various regulatory requirements. If such teclmologies are to be adopted, regulatory barriers to their adoption must be reduced.
• Encouraging Diffusion Through Procurement: Federal
procurement provides the federal government with
substantial power to drive the development and diffusion of technologies in the markets for various
goods and services. The federal government should
develop procurement guidelines that provide substantial incentive for the development and marketing
of low-carbon technologies and services.
• Shifting the Tax Burden from Labor and Wealth Creation to
Carbon: A sure way to increase the incentive to reduce
the use of carbon-based fuels, increase energy efficiency,
and provide incentives on the margin for the development and adoption of climate-friendly technologies is to
place a price on carbon. The easiest way to do this
would be to replace existing taxes on labor and wealth
creation, including some payroll, income and corporate
taxes, with taxes on the carbon content of fuels.I6 2
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161. The value of technology inducement prizes in climate policy is discussed
at length in Adler, supra note 158.
162. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global Climate
Change: Why a Carbon Tax Is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and
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This is not an exhaustive list of potential policy measures, but
these proposals are representative of things policymakers
could do to emphasize and accelerate the development and diffusion of climate-friendly technologies to make atmospheric
stabilization an economically and practically viable alternative.
VI.

AI

CONCLUSION

Global climate change may be the most difficult environmental challenge humanity has ever faced. Addressing concerns about global warming without unnecessarily curtailing
individual liberty and economic growth is an even greater challenge. Because carbon dioxide and other GHGs are so ubiquitous, it is difficult for governments to control GHG emissions
without controlling large portions of the economy and suppressing future economic growth.
The Obama Administration has moved aggressively to curtail
GHG emissions. These efforts are likely to impose substantial
costs and expand federal regulatory power, but are unlikely significantly to mitigate, let alone to prevent, global climate change.
Even substantial emission reductions will not alter tl1e climate's
trajectory to any meaningful degree, and those measures capable
of stabilizing the atmosphere today are untl1inkable in a liberal
society. If the tl1reat of global climate change is to be addressed
at an acceptable cost to economic liberty and human prosperity,
policymakers must chart a new course that emphasizes technological innovation and provides incentives to adopt low-carbon
technologies as they become available. Only this approach has
the hope of keeping us free and cool.
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